

Devolving Nairobi; ‘The Last’ Decentralization in Kenya for Equitable Development

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ABSTRACT

The realization of the immense benefits of decentralization is by far undisputable concept to development, far more to observe in the Kenyan case of the economic decentralization (devolution) attained so far. “Nairobi” as a symbol for development and a concept for modernization in Kenya seems to hold the key to the final effects of devolution required countrywide. The experiential development that Kenya in its former traditional regions need which is attached to its identity groups (ethnic orientations) requires devolving Nairobi in order to effectualize what vision 2030 may be slow to achieve. This paper by using descriptive design employs a desktop study approach to; trace the growth of Nairobi as a modern symbol of modernization, secondly to highlight decentralization of city modernization and enhanced equitable development, and finally examining how the devolution of Nairobi can be a finality to equitable development in Kenya. The paper in its findings concludes that the wholesome centre – periphery model is what devolving Nairobi would help Kenya achieve in the long run.

Keywords: Nairobi/ Devolution/
Decentralization/ Devolving Nairobi/
Decentralizing Kenya/ Kenya/ Last

**Decentralization/ Urbanization Model/
Equitable Development.**

1. INTRODUCTION

Capital cities are symbols of statehood, no wonder in diplomatic circles, a mention of Moscow is in reference to USSR/Russia, Delhi for India, Cairo for Egypt, Paris for France, Lisbon for Portugal, and Nairobi for Kenya. Development of capital cities to the utmost best standards is the desire of all nations yet if the strengths of such developments do not reflect in the people of a particular state by transferring such attributes of modernization then it might be true to deduce an existence of two worlds in one state, a sort of *apartheid* urbanization model (Jo’burg – Soweto designs). In such scenarios, two extremes of societal class tend to expand as inequitable development enhances.

Compounded in much centralization is the impact of the centre versus periphery, especially where the former tends to usurp the latter in development. The different types of inertia continue to spur such centres of civilizations to greater heights, a very positive progress indeed. Unfortunately, in many developing states where proper and equitable development is uniquely attached to identity groups (ethnic orientations), such centralization becomes

questionable as to which major ‘population’ ultimately benefit as to human resourcing and other factors of economic empowerment due to proximate effects.

This then might require decentralization design where factors uniquely associated with the Nairobi like cities is spread across an entire country. Kenya as a country in its devolution stride through the 2010 constitution came up with two aspects of devolution (decentralization of power and economic decentralization). This led to reduction of presidential powers which somehow have almost gone intact after 2013 except in a few areas, and the creation of county structures which are indeed struggling not because they are bad to Kenyans but because they aren’t popular among some class in the ruling regime while also avenues for pundits of corruption. The benefits of these devolution has since taken development to corners which for over fifty years of independence ‘did not belong to Kenya’ development-wise.

However, one major obstacle that lingers in Kenya’s finalization of devolution is the high centralization of Nairobi against other parts. The Nairobi devolution here does not imply breaking our good capital city but re-thinking about decentralizing infrastructural designs to other parts of Kenya (the super highways, industries, the konza cities, international airports, e.t.c.), secondly, decisively devolving inter- governmental organizations (IGOs) to different parts of the country (IGAD offices, UN offices, and EAC secretariats in Kenya), thirdly, decentralizing government headquarters and departments to the former eight traditional regions (provinces) in order to attain equitable modernization. It is also about being development sensitive to its various components. Despite the possibilities of such devolution, Juma and Kiplagat (2016) observe the seemingly constant problem in Kenya. To them, The challenges of Kenya seem to emanate from the ‘form’ – state. Whereas a close look at Kenya like many Westphalia order would show that the idea and concept state is well functional, yet the ‘form’ – state lacks which then has a misbalance on the form – state. The ‘form’ – state takes the conscious scholars to what Kenya was before independence. If the ‘form’ state was properly functional, fifty years after independence would have yielded more Nairobi.

Upholding Nairobi devolution as a concept for modernization has ultimate consequences to the country’s development and with it can places such as Lodwar, Marsabit, Narok, Kakamega, Kisii, and the like feel a projected development likely to impact the lives of their people. To this date apart from the class/elite in Nairobi, much development in Nairobi makes some identity groups advantaged above others for factors of proximity and history of the country tied to its politics which cannot change. Coupled with the new constitutional designs of much resources centralized against the counties (about 85% versus 15%), the circulation at the centre – effects still favours it against the periphery.

2. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Martinez-Vazquez (2011) discusses Basic Theory of decentralization through its meaning thus; countries begin decentralization processes for different reasons. Some are searching for a more efficient—and leaner—public sector, while others are disenchanted with the performance of planning and centralized policies (e.g., socialist economies). “Decentralization” generally means the devolution of decision-making powers. A related concept is “deconcentration,” in which operations are decentralized. Decentralization does not necessarily denote an erosion of central control nor of powers over issues and processes with national dimensions. It is basic because it is concerned with the why aspect of decentralization and from it other major theories emanate.

Following the basic theory, others also express their understanding to the general understanding of this topic. Decentralization is a theme discussed in relation to a wide range of related subjects like public sector reform, democracy, political reform, participation, empowerment, rural development, fiscal and economic development, accountability, and capacity building. (Smoke, 2003). The discourse in this paper deliberately leans on rural development, empowerment, and economic development of peripheral cities as supplements to the main city thus enhancing the aggregate development. This calls for realignment of policies beyond normal practices. When the periphery develops, the centre will powerfully develop but it is possible for centres to develop while peripheries languish.

Mohan and Stokkes (2000) observes Gandhi's advocacy of a decentralized order to have provided an additional source of legitimacy for such initiatives in India and a certain degree of sentimentality in that sense. Words like "transfer", "spreading out", "dispersion", "diffusion", "moving", "placing", "shifting", "devolution", or "delegation" are commonly used in the vocabulary of decentralization. For Nairobi, the concepts as dispersion, diffusion, and shifting centre become important for development.

Moolakkattu and Chathukulam (2015), points that decentralization has a long history. Political thinkers from Montesquieu to Madison suggest that decentralized governance can contribute to democratic participation, better representation, accountability and policy and governmental effectiveness. It is also seen as a means to moderate potential conflict from people who are ethnically and culturally different from the majority groups. Rondinelli and Nellis (1986), who identified four major types of decentralization, have come to rule the roost. They are deconcentration, delegation, devolution, and privatization. Devolution implies the formation of elected local government with the necessary statutory mandate and autonomy to operate without being unduly controlled by the central authority. Among these types of decentralization, in this paper, our focus surrounds deconcentration of Nairobi in terms of services, utilities, and infrastructure. Deconcentration amounted to a form of administrative dispersion of central offices to other regions.

The new public management and good governance stream also added to the impetus on decentralization. For example, Osborne and Gaebler who, in their well-known work 'Reinventing Government', puts it as follows: 'In today's world things simply work better if those working in public organizations — schools, public housing developments, parks training programmes — have the authority to make many of their own decisions'. (Osborne and Gaebler 1993: 251) But the focus of the new public management was more on improving governmental effectiveness in terms of better service delivery for which decentralization was one of the means. This study uses its themes to discuss the objectives around the thesis, "devolving Nairobi; 'the last' decentralization in Kenya for equitable development.

3. TRACING THE GROWTH OF NAIROBI AS A MODERN SYMBOL OF MODERNIZATION

Nairobi is known as an archetype and a representation of African colonial city due to its purity of colonial origins and set ups. It shaped its structure and management mostly during the transition period of Kenya through gaining its independence. The birth of Nairobi as a city and County today was from the European colonial project which was a means of entry into newly colonized land, that is, the railway line (Blevin and Bouczo 1997). Nairobi was characterized by a rapid increase in rural to urban migration which is similar to other African cities that was precipitated by the proliferation of small-scale trade and petty commodity production such as unserviced and unauthorized housing (Lee-Smith 1989).

The set up of Nairobi can be traced to the set up of the European transportation processes that was later transformed into an administrative centre. It was a site deliberated on as it offered a suitable stopping place between Mombasa and Kisumu. There was availability of water due to the nearness of the locality to Nairobi River and the Mbagathi River which offered an ample level land for railway tracts, sidings, quarters; an elevated cooler ground to the west suitable for residential purposes, an apparently deserted land offering freedom for land appropriation and the area was free from tropical diseases (Owuor and Obudho 1997).

It can be deduced that Nairobi did not start as an African village (Hirst 1994). This in itself sends a signal of the symbolism of the city as centre of development. The modernization as a concept varies at length; to the stronger democracies it is attributed to technological advancements which could be viewed differently to struggling African states. For instance, the bulk of the Nairobi region appears to have had no permanent settlements as it was occasionally occupied by the nomadic Maasai who built their manyattas on the higher grounds from time to time (Emig and Ismail 1980).

The urbanity of Nairobi's (Emig and Ismail) did not follow the pattern of pre-colonial model and was not in the Western concept of towns. The location of the city did not match the expectations

of many as it was a centre where functions of a town would be carried out with very few structures being in existence. From the argument, it is clear that the town was itself set up as a source of authority which is today witnessing many governmental and nongovernmental activities being coordinated. Nonetheless this original concept can be negated with the interest of the whole Kenya in focus. The unavailability of the structures associated with the functions could mean that decentralization ideas could have been initially emanating although they were not outlined.

The later concentration of many offices in Nairobi is a show that it was becoming a concentrate centre for development, a very important twist of events. This is indicated by the transfer of the provincial offices from Machakos to Nairobi, and later the protectorate headquarters from Mombasa to Nairobi which contributed to the change in perception of Nairobi from a railway town to an administrative and commercial centre within the British protectorate. Cultures of urbanism began to emerge for the first time. However, even so, after the initial bursts, rates of urban growth tended to be slow somewhat and the African societies remained overwhelmingly rural in orientation (Nevanlinna 1996).

The first comprehensive plan of the city known as Nairobi Master Plan for a Colonial City was commissioned in 1948. It was the first plan in the quest to set up a city although it was never adopted fully. The plan laid down guidelines for Nairobi's future development and earmarked land for major uses as well as making important proposals for extensions to the road network. The plan followed the concept of functionalism that was to create a modern national city to cater for industrial expansion and the growing numbers of African wage-earners working in the industries. The plan also used the garden city concept to divide residential areas into neighbourhood units.

The modernization movement took place in the 1950s and 1960s. It was an economic theory that is rooted in capitalism. Modernization as a concept incorporates the full spectrum of the transition and drastic transformation that a traditional society has to undergo in order to become modern (Hussain et al., 1981). The challenge with modernisation is that Africa has to follow the developmental footsteps of

Europe. This imperative may have varied interpretations. According to modernity, the policies intended to raise the standard of living of the poor often consist of disseminating knowledge and information about more efficient techniques of production. For instance, the agriculture modernisation process involves encouraging farmers to try new crops, new production methods and new marketing skills (Ellis and Biggs, 2001).

The views of modernization are further endorsed by Smith who pointed out that modernisation is about exchanging of older agriculture practices with something more recent (Smith, 1973:61). The extent to which these characteristics are exhibited gives an indication of the degree of modernity that has been reached yet all these activities first were undertaken in Nairobi.

The colonizers in Africa developed modernisation strategies and policies common to most of the established centres. On their arrival in Africa, 'whites' tasked themselves with the responsibility of modernizing the continent. No wonder the reason why they labelled Africa as "dark continent" which needed to be enlightened (modernized). It is the enlightenment idea that motivated Cecil John Rhodes and his entourage to settle in Africa. It is also part of the reason why Rhodes' British South Africa Company (BSAC) embarked on the mission to build a road from Cape of Good Hope in South Africa to Cairo in Egypt. The form and strategies for Africa's development have always been changing in light of the changes in technological and ideological views of the developed world. The then United States of America (USA) president Harry Truman's January 20, 1949 presidential inaugural address captured these sentiments: "We must embark on a bold new programme for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. The old imperialism- exploitation for foreign profit- has no place in our plans . . . (Allen and Thomas, 1992: 06)".

Modernity theorists believe that nations advance to modernity at different paces depending on their adaptability and versatility. Whereas there is an element of truth in the above idea, there is also induced development pace. The road to development is not always smooth. The

illuminating idea in the exploitation of Africa is that too little development limits the amount of surplus value produced in the satellite while on the other hand it could threaten the dominant position of the metropolis. The dependency theory is also top-down in that it assumes that the locals do not have the expertise and ability to fight their poverty. Max-Neef (1991:38) argues that the development geared to the satisfaction of fundamental human needs may not be structured from the top - downwards. It cannot be imposed either by law or decree but by the will of the people. It can only emanate directly from the actions, expectations, and creative and critical awareness of the protagonists themselves. Instead of being the traditional objects of development, people must take a leading role in development hence the idea of decentralizing the modern city.

The growth of the modern city may not be attested to the western aspects of modernity but to put in line with the true African life of unity, communalism and shared purpose. In as much as the growth of Nairobi resulted from Europeans development strategies, development and poverty reduction strategies for Africa should be informed and embroiled in the African values like 'Ubuntu' in South Africa, 'Humwe' in Zimbabwe, 'Harambee' in Kenya and 'Ujamaa' in Tanzania which to a large extent are aspects decentralization and can appeal to the African value system. Like other alternative models, it advocates for a social force that opposes and transcends the growth and dependency paradigms. In the early African sense, just like the overriding theories were unity and togetherness, by implication, equitable development pattern was not an option. Development was to be egalitarian such that benefits were to be disaggregated from the centre where Africans were despite pockets of resistance to change.

The African renaissance theory, unlike its predecessors, advocates for local solutions, pluralism, community-based solutions and reliance on local resources. These phase values and African doctrines can be used to decentralize the city to allow for decongestion. Therefore the critical issue here is (Korten, 1990:4) 'transformation' for the future depends on achieving the transformation of institutions, technology, values and behaviour

consistent with ecological and social realities in Africa.

The racial character of different Nairobi locations still depicts the racial segregation brought about by the spatial organization in the early stages of the development of the city. Europeans resided to the north and west of the railway. These areas were located at higher altitude with richer, volcanic red soils. Africans and Indians were mostly confined to the plains east and south of the railway line where non-porous black cotton soils prevailed. These areas were unhealthy in terms of frequent flooding, high incidence of malaria and neglect of municipal services such as refuse and sewage collection (Achola 2002). It marked the beginning of the differential class structures that can only be equitably diffused through decentralization of services to other urban centres to expand more middle class.

Achola continues to suggest that, the dependency theory attributes rural poverty to the continuous pillage of human and non-human resources from the satellite to the metropolis. The same pattern is discernable between the modern and the traditional communities. The discourse noted with concern that the underdevelopment of Africa is indeed a result of cultural collision between two different development spheres – the West and Africa. The West because of its strategic and technological advantage over Africa, it was able to choke and subdue Africa's culture and value system. In the process, Africa lost its right to determine its way to development. This explains best why Nairobi city has no one dominant culture and is the point of reference in determining change. An example is the urban practices and meanings which continued to reproduce the past cultures despite the end of colonialism all circumnavigating around the city and the elites of the country had largely adopted the notion of modernity and Western values of Europe. As such, Nairobi emerged as a modern metropolis modelled on the Western principles of planning, a leading city in East Africa, a gateway between the first and third worlds and an internationally important centre (Nevanlinna 1996).

Nairobi was also seen as a symbol of uniqueness of the country and its people, not so much in terms of the urban forms in totality, but in terms of individual public buildings which were identified

as symbols of the city, both in theory and in practice. Nevanlinna (ibid), the expression of nationalism is most evident in the built environment of most national capitals. They are marked by institutional buildings such as parliament and government departments to express democratic and sound administration, a business and commercial centre with high rise office buildings and hotels to indicate modernity, the university to imply interest in the advancement of the society, modern planned residential areas to show social consciousness, and the demolition of conspicuously situated squatter settlements to denote the will to erase underdevelopment.

As the same author suggests the emergence of Nairobi as a modern metropolis modelled on the Western principles of planning, a leading city in East Africa, a gateway between the first and third worlds and an internationally important centre. Nairobi was also seen as a symbol of uniqueness of the country and its people, not so much in terms of the urban forms in totality, but in terms of individual public buildings which were identified as symbols of the city, both in theory – as the general request for the development of a national architecture for the newly independent African countries indicated – and in practice.

In contrast, briefly though, other cities in the traditional East Africa had their uniqueness of emergence as giant urban centres. www.safari-in-uganda.com records the version of Kampala's origins as; Kampala was founded in the 19th Century, when the king of Buganda had his seat here in the hills. The name "Kampala" originated from the British envoy Lord Captain Frederick Lugard. There were numerous Impala-Antelopes found here at that time. From the Luganda translation for "*hill of the Impala*", *Kasozi ka Impala*, the short form "Kampala" was developed. This term referred to the hills of present-day Old Kampala, on which the Capt Lugard built his fort. Once the fort was established more and more people were attracted to the city. The town grew rapidly and expanded to 7 hills. Today, referred to as the historical origins of Kampala: *Mulago, Kololo, Kibuli, Rubaga, (Old) Kampala, Namirembe, and Makerere*. Each of the seven hills represents a predominant feature: On the hills Rubaga, Namirembe and Kibuli settled the central bodies of the three leading religious communities

(Catholics, Protestants and Islam). Kololo / Nakasero form the Center for Public Administration and were the preferred residential areas of their employees. Makerere became the university campus and in Mulago settled health facilities. Interestingly, these identities remained until today.

The city status and urbanization of Kampala is an issue of royalty pedigree in addition to being an expert centre and a place of opportunities. The well developed '*Buganda state*' then must have made it a very lucrative and '*modern-old civilization centre*' for many outsiders including the colonialists. Further and in addition to the above narration cited, in 1906 Kampala was declared a town under UK law and it advanced into an administrative municipality in 1949. However it was in 1962 when it received the official status of a city. The British originally had their administrative headquarters in Entebbe and Kampala was only after an election to the capital of the free Uganda. *Okalebo and Sengendo* (Undated) posit the gradual transfer of government ministries and departments from Entebbe (once administrative capital) that started in the 1950's was accelerated when Kampala was granted City status from Municipality, and became the official Capital of Uganda in 1962. Described as the expatriate headquarters, many Africans from beyond the borders of Buganda Kingdom, and many from neighbouring Kenya, came in search for opportunities and settled both in the national capital, in domestic quarters and in the housing estates; and in the periphery of the City, within Mengo area. Already the densest African settlement was in Mengo, the capital of Buganda that had the greatest degree of urban development than any indigenous centre in Eastern and Southern Africa. The same model of concentrate growth as in Nairobi is also seen here, though; African systems meant centrality since they were structured around single nationality.

On the other hand, the growth of Dar es salaam has a long history like many coastal ports that later became major urban areas. According to us the historical space for this city to date centres on three historical thresholds (pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial) which this paper may not endeavour to dwell much on. Brennan and Burton (2007) records, the overview history of Dar es Salaam

proceeds chronologically from the town's inception in the 1860s to its present-day status as one of the largest cities in Africa. Dar es Salaam was first imagined by Sultan Majid of Zanzibar in 1862. The eponymous harbour site upon which it would soon be located then stood unoccupied, but lying adjacent along the sea-facing coast was a small fishing village called Mzizima, perhaps an altered pronunciation of Mji Mzima or 'complete town'. In the early 19th century, Mzizima and the surrounding area had become a meeting point between local ethnic Zaramo inhabitants who traced their origins to the Uluguru mountains some 200 kilometres inland, and self-styled Shomvi, a Swahili or 'Shirazi' people who traced their origins to the northern coastal town of Barawa in present-day Somalia.

Standing out from this emergence is the town being a sea route, associated beauty, a meeting point, and being a place of refuge. According to Brennan and Burton, the town's name, likely contracted from the Arabic for 'Harbour of Peace' (bandar as-salâm), reflects not only the town's most striking feature, its large natural harbour, but also its aspiring status as a place of refuge for Sultan Majid from the growing pressures of courtly and diplomatic politics in Zanzibar. Modelled on his island experience, Majid envisioned a town economically driven by plantation agriculture and long distance caravan trade, and accordingly encouraged Arabs from the Hadramaut (contemporary southeast Yemen) and Indian traders to relocate there in order to develop coconut plantations and trading houses.

Despite all the goodness associated with Dar es salaam, one man Nyerere later on started the 'Nairobi – devolution' in Tanzania by creation of Dodoma as a second city in this land. Mosha (2014), in 1973, the Tanzanian government announced that the capital would be moved from Dar es Salaam to a more central location to better serve the needs of the people. Dodoma was selected for this purpose, as it was an already established town at a major crossroads with an agreeable climate and scope for development. Kategile and Mubi (1993) further add the same year; the Tanzanian government launched a national soil conservation programme, known as the Dodoma Soil Conservation Programme, to improve soil fertility and productivity in the worst

affected areas of the region. Though it is notable and observable that the British favoured Dar es Salaam and Arusha, and the importance of Dodoma declined further in the 1960s with the Tanzam Highway (built by the Chinese) connecting Dar es Salaam – Morogoro - Iringa. Nyerere's action captures the core of this thesis; 'devolving Nairobi'... From Mosha one can note the reason, serving the needs of the people, Kategile and Mubi point to improving a neglected area to make equitable development to a country that belongs to all people. And according to www.world-guides.com slowly a number of the governmental and political offices moved here, including the National Assembly of Tanzania in the mid-1990s.

4. HIGHLIGHTING DECENTRALIZATION OF CITY MODERNIZATION AND ENHANCED EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT

Africa continues to be poor despite the billions worth of bilateral and multi-lateral aid from the developed countries. Perhaps this is why Charton (1980) argues that regional inequalities are not temporary features of the world economy that will disappear with time. The above author goes on to say that the inequalities between regions are more likely to increase than decrease. Consequently, the developed world with its inherent advantages will grow while Africa will stagnate. However, the current discourse believes that the African Renaissance is the panacea to the development irregularities in Africa.

Cities are traditionally engines of social modernization and economic growth and at the same time the theatres in which globalization stages its actions. Most large African cities are centres of national economies, although they are connected to the world economy through (unequal) trade, investment and aid relationships (UN Habitat, 2005). For Africa, this has meant fuelling the already unprecedented urban growth phenomenon and increasing the challenges that go with it. Over-staffing single cities to the detriment of others is not what Africa needs. One key

challenge is the creation of segregation and polarization.

Globalization has been found to play a role in increasing the gap between the rich and the poor, thus creating more isolation, apprehension and division between people. For the effects of globalization to be felt equally, there is need for spread of connecting points. Segregationist global forces that impact Nairobi have their origins in the colonial period where the political, social and economic system favoured the white minority and subsequently the richer Africans and Asians who inherited political and economic power after independence. This has been worsened by the rapid urbanization of the city in a situation of continued economic development, which has outpaced the financial and administrative capacity of the government to ensure that the city provides efficient locations for economic activities and satisfy basic needs of all citizens.

Just like in other African cities (UN Habitat, 2005), globalization has resulted in significant economic, social, political, spatial and demographic impacts in Nairobi. On the economic front, advances in communication and information technologies, improved transportation and deregulation of capital markets (but not labour markets) have enabled private investors to take advantage of national differences in tax rates, labour costs and environmental restrictions to maximize financial returns by moving development, production and marketing functions to the most profitable locations. It has also been observed that globalization reinforces urban primacy thereby increasing the sheer scale of urban growth.

In the political realm, the most significant impact of globalization on Nairobi has been the weakening of national and local public institutions relative to external private economic power. The privatization of public services in many cities is one outcome of this process, in which investors pick the more profitable services and, further eroding urban revenue and leaving the poorly performing services.

Under globalization, the spatial structure of Nairobi is changing as new economic production patterns require more horizontal integration between functions in different sites. As industries in Nairobi

shift their attention to external locations and activities, this has resulted in new geographies of the region and a breakage of earlier urban spatial patterns. The associated decentralization has major implications for investments in infrastructure development and maintenance. Such investments have been highly uneven, which in turn has significant impacts on access to urban services necessary for livability.

At the metropolitan level, important changes can be seen as well. Nairobi has expanded well beyond its boundaries. These changes have spatial, institutional and economic dimensions. One of the most visible aspects of recent metropolitan development has been its spatial expansion, spilling over to the adjacent jurisdictions and incorporating them within the larger municipality of the central city. Decentralization of jobs in the manufacturing sector and people is an important part of this process, in many places leading to polycentric forms, with economic activities clustered around transportation nodes.

Institutionally, (www.publicadministration.un.org) admits that spatial expansion has been accompanied by a proliferation of administrative entities with responsibilities for different aspects for metropolitan government including a metropolitan planning authority and the newly created Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development. When properly designed, decentralization policies and programmes can impact positively on the performance of local governance institutions, service delivery agencies, and ultimately, on local economic growth and poverty eradication efforts. However, for this to happen, it is necessary that the policy instruments be designed in conformity to the desired goals. A local government, with the autonomy to make independent fiscal decisions, should be considered as a necessary pre-condition for fiscal decentralization. This autonomy involves the power to levy taxation, explore independent revenue sources, and to decide on expenditure priorities. The alternative is to prolong the dependence on the center for grants, subventions, and other forms of transfers, and by so doing, striking at the heart of local self-government.

According to www.rti.org/sites, we have reached a global tipping point: more people now live in urban

than in rural areas. By 2030, urban areas worldwide will house an additional 1.4 billion people. As urban populations in developing countries grow, so does the demand for basic services, infrastructure, land, and affordable housing while climate change exacerbates existing vulnerabilities and creates new challenges. In addition, with more countries decentralizing administrative and fiscal authority to city and local governments, cities often are responsible for closing the gap in service provision between the poor and the wealthy. This statement threatens many big cities that continue to grow through neglect of periphery but advantageously is the recognition of the significance of decentralization a likely alternative to the dilemma.

5. EXAMINING HOW DEVOLUTION OF NAIROBI CAN BE FINALITY TO EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA

Silently, questions about who owns Nairobi have lingered in the minds of Kenyans, and in addition to it, who ultimately benefits much from the resources within Nairobi and the shared devolved resources remain a point to ponder over. The effects of the erstwhile 85% centralized Kenya's budget still impacts Nairobi positively before cascading to the rest of the country and this is what devolving Nairobi will end up meaning to other parts of Kenya. Simplistic views in our devolution imagines that as a country we have gained much, yet in terms of opportunity cost, the current scenario makes other regions in the country advantaged immensely thus big inequalities. Many would want to own Nairobi in terms of power and economic wise from past to present. The current disposition makes Nairobi all geared towards overgrowing while other urban centres in other regions deteriorate. A picture of progress against degeneration pushes population explosion to Nairobi thus serious urbanization problems for the city itself. Suppose it was the reverse, Kenya would experience many Nairobi like cities risen over the last fifty years.

To confirm the many desires to ownership of Nairobi within power politics can be observed from some sentiments expressed by political classes. Ayaga (2016) reports Murang'a Senator's Kemberi

Gitura expressing an interest in raising a bill proposing putting Nairobi under a full control of a Cabinet Secretary (CS) and being delisted from among the delimited counties because it is the seat of the Presidency. The underlying thinking is that being a cosmopolitan place the enlightened folks (opinions) seem to always view politics in parallel to the regime in place which undermines their efforts. On the other hand, investment-wise, there is an existing bourgeois who have some common historical linkage that would want to control the city. The interest in delisting Nairobi is further meant to enhance inequity of the centre from the periphery which would further cause regional disparities to the interest of some bourgeois class and identity group.

In his economic insight analysis, XNiraki (2016), comments that "Nairobi seems to be turning into a giant bedroom. Why the bedroom? Because the new buildings rarely take care of you when you are awake or not working – no parks, no playfields for children, no theatres and no industries except for services, dominated by eateries and beer joints. ..." His views surround the fear of exhaustion that Nairobi currently experiences which leads to a moral question of why the city should be stressed whereas we can decentralize the Nairobi like effects to the other parts. The opposing view to this feeling which almost many agree to is anchored on the circulation of the centralized national funds which finds itself in Nairobi.

Unlike those that support continual enhancement of Nairobi into the giant bedroom as XNiraki suggests, others see devolution as a timely concept in the development of Kenya. Netya and Too (2016) reports Governor Simon Kachapin, "Devolution is like independence to us. The region lagged behind in development for decades before the advent of regional governments. ..." Devolution to Kenyans is a concept that must be understood in terms of benefits to identity groups. This reflects in any development endeavours that the leadership must always be sensitive to. Recently, Hon. Gideon Moi (Mabatuk, 2016) reminded the President about his 2.8 billion waiver to coffee farmers in Central Kenya thus, "I humbly request the President to extend the waiver to other regions. What he did during his development tour in Central Kenya is commendable ..." Moi the Senator here questions why the same should not be

done to other parts thus raising the dire need of equitable development through devolving available resources equitably (one of Kenya's political problems since independence).

Nairobi remains an associational concept to many models of development just as it is to governance issues. The parallels of devolution of Nairobi that have so far taken root that used to be anathema include; Parliaments versus County Assemblies, CSs versus County Ministers, Centralized Expenditures versus Devolved Expenditures (CDFs and Counties), and Provincial/National Administration versus County Administration. The effects of these have extended shadows and real development to many, depending on how the snippets have been utilized and much more would mean more impacts. Deconcentrating Nairobi is one effort towards equity in Kenya. On one hand Kenya's leaders have kept on talking about infrastructural development yet outside Nairobi it is hardly felt. Designs to derail this process and steal from Kenyans repeatedly occur by intelligent differentiations as to National Roads versus County Roads yet all efforts are geared to developing Kenya, why mistrust if it is not about 'controlling – to loot syndrome' and thereby delaying the desired outcome development.

Challenges will always stay side by side with the concept devolving Nairobi hence the obstacles should be ways of reinvention for progress. Skeptics may see much bottlenecks but every society pushed by its own experiences will at some point attain equilibrium as that provided by economic forces of supply and demand. Despite these challenges, how decentralization has impacted on some countries is a reflection on how it can affect cities too, generally.

In this analysis, first, decentralization has generally positively impacted education outcomes. In Bolivia, Faguet (2004) found that decentralization made public investment in education and other services more responsive to local needs. In Indonesia, Simatupang (2009) and Qibthiyah (2008) also noted improved education outcomes after decentralization, such as in overall and female literacy rates, years of schooling, and dropout rates for primary and secondary education.

Secondly, in the health sector, decentralization has had more mixed results. In Argentina, Habibi et al. (2003) found that revenue decentralization had a significant impact on decreasing infant mortality, and Robalino, Picazo, and Voetberg (2001) similarly discovered that countries where local governments manage a higher share of public expenditures tended to have lower mortality rates. And finally, regarding other services, the evidence on the impact of decentralization is also mixed but strongly positive. In Porto Alegre, Brazil, Santos (2005) noted that decentralized participatory budgeting by citizens led to increased access to water and sewage services. In the Republic of Korea, Wade (1998) found increases in efficiency in decentralized irrigation systems as opposed to inefficient centralized systems in India.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Having undertaken the research, it is prudent to point that good cities is what everyone would want especially in description of the modernization of the state, but again, as this paper describes much developed centre with unmatched periphery reflects a journey to nowhere in development terms. It is therefore good to balance. Whereas decentralization has become a very popular terminology, states must be ready for its consequences in achieving the constitutional demands.

The first and the short lived decentralization at independence in Kenya was meant to be administrative, economic, and political. This could have realigned Kenya with the Nairobi effect regionally much earlier. The current decentralization possess a paltry economic and pseudo – political effect where the centre controls the periphery. The logic that reigns is that, the 12% will be stolen by political cartels at the counties looks appealing hence a valid justification to withhold 87% of the country's resources in Nairobi. Morally, where are the bulk of Kenyans found in need of development? The logic implies Nairobi is safer from cartels which is not true. The 'Last' decentralization may possess the characteristics of the preceding two and additionally consider devolution from an in-depth understanding.

Devolution of the “Nairobi” (concept) like cities to allow for decentralization of services, infrastructure, and other power – based attributes is what Kenya and similar countries need to discourage *apartheidic* development models. The need for equitable development stands a basic need to all citizens and its complexity becomes much more to states that experience corporate nationalism such as Kenya, the reason being the ‘national ego’ need to be somehow met in all development strategies and plans. If therefore decentralization of diverse areas associated with urbanization has worked elsewhere, then they can be possibly implemented to work in totality in Kenya by devolving the Nairobi effect in Kenya.

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