

From Bipolar to Unipolar: The Constant United States of America (USA) Global Foreign Policy and Its Implications

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ABSTRACT

This paper sought to evaluate whether USA foreign policy from bipolar to unipolar is changing, in addition to its global implications. The periods following the World War II redefined the world politics dramatically. From the alliances hitherto formed and the outcomes from actions, decisions, and strategies jointly pursued, it became apparent that among the many antagonist – hostile states, one from both side of the great divide emerged with capability to cause real threat globally and to the opposite “perceived – equal” power. This scenario easily led to bipolarism which soon changed into unipolarism in favour of USA. By using two objectives; examining USA foreign policy during bipolar period, and analyzing USA foreign policy in the ensuing unipolar, this study uses descriptive design. Through exploration of available authoritative literature, I arrive at a conclusion that USA foreign policy under different polarisms has not quite changed except the international system structure and personalities involved in her foreign policy.

Keywords: Polarism, Bipolar, Bipolarism, Unipolar, Unipolarism, USA, Foreign Policy, Cold War, International System.

1. INTRODUCTION

The international system was very interesting and complex to evaluate up to the period extending to 1945. Many scholars see it comprising many state players. As Waltz (1979) point, “Until 1945 the nation-state system was multi-polar, and always with five or more powers. ...”. Complex to evaluate because many unpredictable players existed with no outright supreme power thus lines of real threats and hostilities could interestingly be expected to pop from anywhere.

Prior to 1945 and the rise of USA and USSR to superpowerism, many other states had become and they were still forces to reckon with in international polity. Nye (Summer 1990) believe that “historically, the primary measure of a nation's power has been its military capability, be they Roman legions or Spanish tercios. Sixteenth-century Spain boasted of its trade with the Indies, the Far East, and especially with the colonies of the new world. A steady supply of raw materials, finished products, gold and silver made it possible for Spain to control the wealth, industry, and political aspects of the world. As economic power was to sixteenth century Spain's source of wealth, it

also contributed to its downfall as a world power.

Throughout the centuries, the 17th century mercantilist theorists who focused on Spain's reserve of gold bullion would not have understood Holland's or France's rise through conditions favorable (Nye, 1990) to political stability and commerce. According to (Christopher, 1992), the defeat of the Spanish Armada allowed the Netherlands to become the world power in the seventeenth century. Its navy was strong enough to keep the sea lanes open for the traders to capitalize on the new world markets in South, Central, and North America as well as Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Far East.

"This comparatively tranquil situation ended with the French Revolution and Napoleonic Empire. Besides its great army led by Napoleon, France is credited with several factors that made it a world leader. In population, France dominated Western Europe. Traditionally the test of a great power was its strength for war. Population, during this time, was a critical asset for taxation and the enrollment of members of an armed force. Along this same line, the French Revolution, coupled with the large French Army, sense of national pride and political ideology made the populace enthusiastic for the first time in the history of a world power (Christopher, 1992).

Great Britain became the next world power by the eighteenth century. This came as situations were challenging richer, more populous France for superiority in Europe. Brewer (1989), toward the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century, England made its move to global leadership and power through an explosion in the industrial revolution and, of course, the building of a strong navy. Traditionally, historians such as John Brewer have attributed England's rise

to its political and economic freedoms, its strong mercantile economy and the extraordinarily efficient finance and credit system.

Professor Nye, (in March 1990) when discussing the evolution of power, seems to generally support these elements of Great Britain's power during the 19th century but adds that nation's ability to impose a global free-trade system coupled with economic stability. Kennedy (1987) Yale historian Paul Kennedy in his book *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* argues that England's roots of decline, like other global leaders, began with overextension of its military and economic might.

America assumed an internationalist role only reluctantly after economic predominance had been established for half a century, after a crushing military assault on a U.S. territory in 1941 catalyzed the nation out of its isolationist torpor, and after the globalization of the Cold War kept America engaged (Christopher, 1992). The United States, from the Declaration of Independence, to World War II, was a largely isolationist nation state. Washington's injunction against permanent" and entangling alliances had such a far-reaching legacy that America fought World War I as an 'associate power, (Snow, 1991) ostensibly unencumbered by the sordid obligations of multilateral coalitions. Cronin (1991), many consider that the Soviet Union became at the same time in history a true world power leader. Author William Pfaff (Pfaff, 1991) believes that the Soviet Union, although rose to superpower status, it was never in the same league as the United States.

Politically, the United States and the USSR were at odds. The free nation's leadership responded with harsh words and actively spoke out against communism. Prime Minister Churchill's famous "Iron Curtain" speech of 1946 began this

communism bashing followed by every U.S. President. The Truman Doctrine in 1947 pitted good against evil. President Eisenhower portrayed 'forces of good and evil, freedom pitted against slavery, and lightness against darkness. (Kennedy, 1987). With this position taking and hard stances and bashing, the Cold War had begun and has been witnessed, it continued for the next forty to fifty years up to 1991.

2. CONCEPTUALIZING FOREIGN POLICY DEFINITION

The diagram below defines foreign policy in pictorial summary.

other organizations in world stage. Secondly, on this premise, underlying foreign policies are perceptions which are derivatives of national interests and national objectives. In the framework above, I tend to look at foreign policy definitively as comprising majorly relations of two or more states (realists' view) or it may extend relations of states with other actors in the world scene (liberalist's view) as far as decisions and actions are concerned to advance national interest for attainment of national objectives following some strategies; and where possible tools such as *carrots, sticks, and sermons* can be used by a given state in her pursuit(s).




Fig. 1: Foreign Policy pictorial explanation

Source: Thomas Otieno Juma (2016)

The definition of Foreign Policy (FP) may differ from scholar to scholar. However, there are certain fundamentals that form the basis of the definition which are constant. One, they are projected by states in inter-state relations or between states and

It is interesting again to note in the international politics that whereas national interests are inherent in states (a given) and objectives should naturally flow from them, sadly, some states especially developing wallow in non- definitive policies thus projecting 'master-foreign interests' and

'objectives' for their own. Without such ingredients states are in jeopardy of their existence, and attainment of survival for their subjects remains hanging on the balance. I may even sum up at this point that weak states do not necessarily have interests of their own; they respond to their stronger partners interests.

The age long understanding of foreign policy has much changed during the 20th and 21st century to a point where singularist view of state to state/ non-state actors has somehow graduated more of its activities to pluralist approach. Not to suggest that states are declining but rather there is acceleration of pluralists approach.

In the process of decisions and actions by country (state) "A" to state "X", counter-actions also take place directly or indirectly between the states or sometimes through the so called non- state actors or bodies acting beyond borders. I want to suggest an exciting observation as an international relations scholar that, the sweeping use of the word 'non-state' actor may need a rethink in its meaning and a new coinage of clear synonym. This is because so far the reference is made to organizations which originate from somewhere (a state) and mostly owe much allegiance to some state by origin, thus 'non-state' by nature or implication is neither here nor there. In concurrence, classifications of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) stand the conceptual and time test. The use of non – state actors would properly mean what this paper calls "other actors" in the conceptual framework.

3. EXAMINING USA FOREIGN POLICY DURING BIPOLAR PERIOD

The ushering in of two powers after the 1945 WW II led to an already defined foreign policy path built

on hostility where the aggressor and the "victim of aggression" was known and implied both for USA and USSR. Each practiced what in African jungle setting one would term the Lion – Cheetah syndromes in their domains. Both perceive they control optimum strength in their spheres but with fear for each other for the unknown.

For years according to Edwards (2011), American foreign policy has lurched back and forth between conflicting priorities. This is not due to cognitive deficiency but because when it comes to dealing with the rest of the world, America is intentionally and properly bipolar. On the one hand there are the pulls of reality. "Realpolitik" is a *strategic* approach to international relations. The principal responsibility of a government is to ensure the safety of its own people. In some cases, that requires the use of military force against a clear enemy. But by extension, it may also be seen as necessitating involvement, with the use of either hard or soft American power, in areas where instability or a potential threat to the availability of important natural resources is thought to pose a longer-term but equally serious danger.

Taking a view of USA foreign policy in bipolar period, one finds it easily divisible and observed in five categories. Two are more profound to the core of bipolarism. Papp (1994) classifies them as skeptical cooperation and outright hostility. He avers that UN became a functional reality creating an era of skeptical cooperation cooling conflicts and extending to 1947 despite disagreements between USSR and USA on many issues. This ushered in a postwar equilibrium, a divided Germany and maintenance of spheres of influence by superpowers. From 1947 – 1955, both sides engaged in military alliances and economic ties in their spheres of influence under tight control (what

built outright hostility). As much as the two form the basis of USA foreign policy in the bipolar period, three other determinants of USA foreign policy in bipolar is defined by; *rapprochement and confrontation* (1955-1969), *détente* (1969-1979), and *measured confrontation* (1979-1988).

Despite all these, USA specific policies just like other countries has immensely also depended on role of leadership. At the core of USA foreign policy in the post-World War II was the containment of the Soviet Union and its ideology communism. Initiated by Truman, it was named after him. This took three strategic fronts militarily, economically, and ideologically. Somehow, this containment seemed to spread through the entire period of cold war under different forms by one US leader to another. Against this thought, Ward (2006) thinks, the bipolar international power structure did not allow the United States the ability to pick its battles. The power structure that constrained the Cold War forced the United States to react to the Soviet Union, and it forced foreign policy makers to always consider the Soviet Union's response to its policies.

It is important to note the roles played by successive US Presidents during this period in the foreign policy interpretation and analysis. It is understandable that the ten Presidents over this period starting with Franklin D. Roosevelt and ending with George Bush are people to evaluate in terms of behavior and policy wise. The list of such Presidents during the period also include; Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Johnson, Richard M. Nixon, Gerald R. Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan respectively.

The goal of President Franklin Roosevelt's foreign policy found in his belief was much an emphasis whose focus was about moving the United States *from isolation to intervention*. He started this movement cautiously by establishing diplomatic relations and opening trade markets with the Soviet Union and Latin American through the *Good Neighbor Policy*. It could be developing out of his many years at the helm of leadership and involvement in hard conflicts. It is not a policy of resigning because it is the catapult of USA global superiority.

Following on Roosevelt closely, came in The Truman Doctrine as an American foreign policy created to counter Soviet geopolitical spread during the Cold War. It was first announced to Congress by President Harry S. Truman on March 12, 1947 and further developed on July 12, 1948 when he pledged to contain Soviet threats to Greece and Turkey. Miscamble (2008) asserts that Franklin Roosevelt, that great conjurer and juggler, left to his successor rather inflated expectations and unrealistic hopes for postwar peace that then influenced and restricted the Truman administration's policymaking for almost two years.

In this climate then, under Truman's leadership (Miscamble, 2008) observes the foreign policy of the United States underwent a major transformation. From *limited engagement* and even to somewhat *irresponsible restraint* in the affairs of the world beyond the western hemisphere during the nineteen-thirties, the United States *assumed sweeping international obligations* during the years of Truman's presidency. Motivated in large part by a desire to

preserve the security of the non-communist world from Soviet expansionism. Truman raised no serious concerns regarding whether the atomic bomb was a legitimate weapon of war. Nor did he raise any questions about the plans to use atomic bombs against the Japanese. Notably, no action of the Japanese government or military encouraged Truman to consider any change in strategy (containment policy).

In closer link to Truman's, I can observe that Eisenhower saw containment alone as not enough to stop Soviet expansion, and therefore he adopted a policy brand named *Massive Retaliation*, in which the U.S was prepared to use atomic weapons if they were to be attacked. John F. Kennedy's short stint at the Presidency ushered in foreign policy which meant confrontations with some heady obstacles.

Paterson (2003) records that; Kennedy's foreign policy was a mixture of sincere *idealism and traditional anti-Communist* fervor. Kennedy once said that one *man "can make a difference."* We may quibble with such an emphasis on individuals in history. It *obscures the basic continuity* in American foreign policy, the traditional expansionism and interventionism spawned by a liberal ideology and by the real economic and strategic needs of a large, industrial power with global interests. Kennedy did not represent a sharp break with the past or uniqueness in the fundamental tenets of American foreign policy. Yet *the different methods he chose to use*, the personal elements *he applied to diplomacy*, did matter in heating up the Cold War, threatening nuclear war, and implanting the United States in the Third World as never before. Kennedy's "containment generation" imbibed several lessons from the

postwar years of the Soviet-American confrontation: that toughness against communism works; that a nation must negotiate from strength to strength.

Soon in his initial stages as President, Kennedy's foreign policy inherited from Eisenhower extends to be a quintet – Presidential (Eisenhower, Kennedy, Lyndon, Nixon, and Gerald Ford) US policy in one issue – Vietnam. From the Kennedy administration, one can observe the escalation of the war through to Johnson administration, to the final resolution of the war at the Paris Peace Talks and the evacuation of U.S. troops in 1973.

Jimmy Carter's administration (1977-81) made him the 39th President of the United States. His resolve was to make the US "competent and compassionate" in the midst of an economic crisis. In his speech Carter (1977), "It is a new world that calls for a new American foreign policy ... We have reaffirmed America's commitment to human rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy". Hargrove (1997) suggests, few presidents have expressed such passion for human rights, as has Jimmy Carter. In both his 1977 inaugural address and a commencement speech given at the University of Notre Dame later that year, Carter shared his vision for a new era in American foreign policy—one based on the democratic idealism of Woodrow Wilson, which championed freedom, peace, and human rights.

Ronald Reagan administration intended to win the cold war which he didn't at last. Critical analysis at Reagan's regime, it is profoundly concluded that he escalated the Cold War with the Soviet Union, but making a great departure from the policy of détente (easing of the geo-political tensions between the USSR and USA) by his predecessors Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter. In his shoes

George Bush renewed the escalation Operation Desert Storm and forging more control of the Middle East. His reign saw communism collapse and hence pronouncements of his policy dubbed the *new world order* (world without communism – triumph of capitalism).

According to Mandelbaum (1990), in 1989 the greatest geopolitical windfall in the history of American foreign policy fell into George Bush's lap. In a mere six months the communist regimes of Eastern Europe collapsed, giving the West a sudden, sweeping and entirely unexpected victory in its great global conflict against the Soviet Union. Between July and December of 1989 Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania ousted communist leaders. Their new governments each proclaimed a commitment to democratic politics and market economics, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Europe began. All this happened without the West firing a single shot.

In summary this study finds that, the US major wars (WW I, WW II, and start of Cold War) foreign policies have been presided during the reigns when democrats party are in power. Even though cold war begun during democrat's regime, it ended in a republican regime. It is not to suggest that one particular party is more prone to war mongering but whether it is a coincidence, it is not clear and much studies may follow this observation. The table below indicates some of the major wars fought by the USA and their prevailing foreign policies during the bipolar.

Summarily again, it is observable that Nixon in the drive for *Détente* pushed *moralism* to the periphery for *pragmatism* in his Vietnamization. He made strategic arms limitations with the Soviets based on negotiations. Whereas Jimmy projected a new

global order, Bush presided over it shortly in his regime, something that Reagan in his neo-containment (of Soviet expansionism in 3rd world looked forward to). Neo-containment according to Reagan strategists was meant to provide an environment of constructive engagement in global politics.

A point to note is that United States always fashion their foreign policy between *moralism* and *pragmatism*. Moralism is used when an action is to advance a course for enhancement of civil society whereas pragmatism occurs when an action done does not offend other partners and presumably as it continues not to it is good. A good example for the latter can be the incidence of sale of weapons by the US during the Napoleonic wars to the concerned parties. Thus pragmatism can as well be seen as accepted actions treated with fairness and propriety. Perkins (1966) asserts, if a nation shows that it knows how to act with decency in industrial and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, then it need fear no interference from the USA. Brutal wrong-doing, or an impotence which results in general loosening of ties of civilized society, may finally require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the US might act as a policeman, at least in the Caribbean region.

In this regard, it is observable how strong democracies posture in the global stage in as far as foreign policy is concerned hence other states' foreign policies may be secondary to 'superior ones' if in their perception certain things are not in order. To the US, moralism has been tied to what they call their sense of mission and legitimate intervention character (built on liberty and justice thus a given).

Table 1: Selected Wartime Foreign Policies and US Internal Dynamics

Major Global Wars	Presiding US President	Ruling Party	Year (from – to)	Existing Foreign Policy
WW I	Woodrow Wilson	Democrat	1914 - 1918	Progressive Reformer esp. protection of democracy
WW II	Frankline Roosevelt	Democrat	1939 – 1945	Good Neighbor Policy (<i>from isolation to intervention</i>)
Vietnam War	Eisenhower, Kennedy, Lyndon, Nixon, Ford	Republican, Democrat, Democrat, Republican, Republican	1953 - 1977	Responsible restraint, Massive Retaliation, Diplomacy
Cold War	10 Presidents	All Parties (18 Years Democrats and 27 Years Republicans)	1947 - 1991	Policies from 1939 onwards

4. ANALYZING USA FOREIGN POLICY IN THE ENSUING UNIPOLAR

To understand a country's foreign policy for self-conscious states, it is prudent to understand of the challenges of a particular time in history. Just as the bipolar had its own issues at hand, so does the unipolar (post-Cold War) period. On this basis we can understand the challenges confronting this period as the sum of derivatives for the foreign policies.

With disintegration of bipolar system of the international relations and the end of the "cold war" on the verge of 80th and 90th of the 20th century, the United States of America remained the only

super-state in the world (Bush, 1992). Being the U.S. President, on January 28, 1992 in his message he declared to the Congress of the USA: "*Yesterday's problems are behind, tomorrow's – ahead*". The situation in foreign policy for the United States of America from 80th years of the 20th century changed strongly. The old principles directed to control of the Euroasian aggressor in the person of the USSR became more irrelevant. As George Bush declared, "communism died".

Of course analysis would agree that it was a paradigm shift from dual- commanding foreign policy alliance to mono- command foreign policy but again deeper understanding of world politics would appreciate that the balance of power principles hardly give room for such regime, if it

exists it is short lived. I am not pessimistic to the reign of USA but rather oblivious to the principles of global regime. The global regime is about military, economic, and diplomatic power. The globe like any other political system in this case operates within this reality. Very true as per Bush's words, yesterday's problems were gone which were viewed in arms race from the big picture (among global powers). To African countries political alliances that hitherto existed created orphaned babies among the states with anxieties whereas to other peripheral powers Europe and Asia then an opportunity to fill the void became an excitement. It opened up the country to much unknown just like communisms end. This view was echoed by W. Clinton (www.presidency.ucsb.edu), in the inauguration speech he declared that the United States of America faced the call of forming an absolutely new foreign policy in fundamentally changed world, having confirmed that crash of communism inevitably attracted new dangers and difficulties to the USA.

Since then, we see the US in action; Penkovtsev, Zinnatullin, and Nikulshin (2016) points that *Expansion* of the American influence over the whole world, attempt of deduction and strengthening of one-polarity by the principle of absolute and global domination of the United States of America became one of the main priorities of the USA foreign policy during the post-bipolar period. In May, 1993 the president W. Clinton signed the directive No. 13 directed to increase the UN role in the USA peacekeeping operations. This directive was urged to replace the tradition of rivalry of two super-states which developed in the years of "cold war" with international cooperation in affairs of peace-making and prevention of armed conflicts worldwide.

Variations exist in the international system (Tchantouridze', 2012) and have been theoretically connected with the rise and fall of great powers, the re-distribution of power among and between these powers, the relationship among them, and, most importantly, the stability of the system itself. "Poles" are normally identified with great or dominant powers in the system – a fairly non-controversial theoretical assumption as such. Again, it is emphasized that the discourse on unipolarity has probably influenced decision-makers in more ways by creating an exaggerated picture of United States capabilities and a false sense of America's place and role in the post-Soviet world (Bergedorf Round Table 2004). According to Wohlforth (2000), Charles Krauthammer was the first to champion the idea of a unipolar world. According to his article published in *Foreign Affairs*, Krauthammer pointed out that the United States mistakenly believed that the world was multipolar whereas in fact it was unipolar, with the United States as the sole superpower. Krauthammer also coined "the unipolar moment" phrase, insisting that the world entered "the new strategic environment" with "the centre of world power" being "the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies". Moreover, the unipolar world by Thomas Mowle and David Sacko opens with the following passage: "In 1991, international politics entered a new era. For the first time in modern history, the world was unipolar: it had only one center of economic, military, and political power: the United States" (Mowle and Sacko, 2007).

The very end of the Cold War is one of the milestones in global politics but what replaced it is not quite known to many scholars. The system has been quite unclear. Did it change to multipolarity or bipolarity to ask pertinently? A hot discussion

between skeptics and idealists is that (Gaiser, L. & Kovač, I., 2012), the bipolarity of the Cold War was simply a change into multipolarity due to the lack of political will of the United States to act on the unipolar moment. In 2001, and with a new president in office, the structure changed again. This time the G.W. Bush administration was keen to play the role of a global governor. However, this unipolar moment only lasted until 2006, when the world gradually transformed into a uni-multipolar structure as a result of the relative decline of the US' economic power.

The notion of economic decline in 2006 making US weaker is somehow disputed by Joffe (2009). He explains that even with the economic crisis, the US economic predominance is not threatened. He writes: "In all instances of declinism, economic failure serves as Exhibit A. But current figures show the US economy to be worth \$14.3 trillion, three times as much as the world's second-biggest economy, Japan's, and only slightly less than the economies of its four nearest competitors combined—Japan, China, Germany, and France. Today, there is only one challenge to the dominance of the US economy: the European Union's aggregate GDP of \$18 trillion. But the more appropriate comparison may be with the 16-member Euro-zone, which has a common monetary policy and a rudimentary common fiscal policy—and a collective GDP of \$13.5 trillion. The US also comes out ahead among major powers in terms of per capita income, with \$47,000 per inhabitant. It is followed by France and Germany (both in the \$44,000 range). Additionally, the US military power is unreachable. In 2008, the US spent \$607 billion on its military, representing almost half of the world's total military spending. The next nine states spent a combined total of \$476 billion, and the presumptive challengers to the US

military supremacy—China, India, Japan, and Russia—together devoted only \$219 billion to their militaries. Similar can be said about the 'soft power' of the US. Of the world's top 20 universities, all but three are in the US; of the top 50, all but 11 are located in the US.

The clarity of the economic strength is again put to question by (Lukin, 2016) who views thus, China, the world's second-largest economy and most densely populated country, poses a threat not because of its military capabilities, which still fall short of the United States' and even Russia's, but because communist China has succeeded where the Soviet Union failed: it has built an effective and attractive economy that is not based on the Western political model. The Chinese economy has become so interdependent with the American and European economies that it would be very difficult to deal with Beijing in the same way that Russia has been dealt with. The West depends on China economically just as much as China depends on the West. If a serious conflict were to break out, a united West might eventually prevail, but at unbearable cost to the global economy. This latter position challenging Joffe's assertion might need more interrogations to confirm the position of American economy.

In closely analyzing the US foreign policy in this post-cold war, the administration of G.H.W. Bush stressed that foreign policy is not their priority (Heffernan, 2005). However, it made quite an impact in international affairs. In 1989 it intervened in Panama (Operation Just Cause), in 1991 Bush and Gorbachev signed a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty—START I (negotiations lasted 9 years), and most importantly the US begun the Gulf War in January 1991. Despite these actions the G.H.W. Bush administration did not develop a *new foreign*

policy vision and strategy for a new situation in international affairs. Furthermore, neither did the first Clinton administration (Stein and Lobell, 1997). In my view, the fluidity of the post – cold war global order has necessitated a reactionary foreign policy paradigm for the USA based on their orientations towards moralism and pragmatism extremes. This is supported by the thinking that challenges and aggressions upon which supremacy is exerted are ever emerging.

This period has seemingly ushered in a passive hegemonic order precipitating the rise of anarchy. Was it the likely cause of the many wars facing the globe and the genocides as witnessed in Africa which Mearsheimer (2001) points to? I negate his trajectory by suggesting that these occurrences upto mid ‘90’s were continuations of the bipolar demise effects (its weaning effects). Emphasizing on the passiveness, Ikenberry (1996), the Clinton administration continued to be passive in the international arena. Though he ushered in a great line of emphasis, with the Clinton’s ‘*trade first*’ *policy*—during his two administrations, over 300 of trade agreements were ratified and implemented (Clinton, 2000). According to the ‘Clinton doctrine’ the US does not need allies because in the economic markets one does not know who is an ally and who is a competitor; hence the US foreign policy was reduced to power-economics (Nau, 1995).

I consider Clinton’s suggestion that in economic market there is no need of allies as “*friend – foe equilibrium foreign policy*”. This decision depicts a big shift from military to economic power politics and might probably be the basis of the “*New – Cold War*”. In addition to these Clintonian policies, he maintained *security and economic containment* policy through *intervention and isolationism*

(among traditional US policies), and proxy policy. The US choice to diffuse itself within the systemic spheres through the UN in post – cold war is a weakness and a policy all the same, because it is exercising power through institutions. To a greater extent, interventionism can be understood to be a policy and a tool at the same time. Anchoring itself on the notion of new – cold war, one may ask; what would be toxic with this era as compared to the atomic/ ballistic missiles and the nuclear war heads? Is it the effects of *marketization and commodification*? Whatever it is, it will draw two distinct ‘poles’ that will then shape foreign policies of states.

Coming shortly after Clinton, George W. Bush falls in the real dilemma of the after bipolar with oscillations in different directions with US foreign policy. The G.W. Bush Administration came into office confident of the US supremacy, especially military, and was determined to *preserve it* (Friedberg, 2009). Bush and Putin with an informal Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) agreement (Raščan, 2005), transforming the US armed forces to prepare them for twenty-first century warfare against future advanced opponents (Rice, 2000), refusing to sign the Kyoto Protocol, and refused to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Ikenberry (2002) saw this new USA foreign policy strategy as *neo-imperialistic*. Moreover, the key feature of the new concept is *coping with rogue regimes* (containment in a new era), and managing Beijing and Moscow (Rice, 2000). Early on the G.W. Bush administration saw China and Russia as strategic challenges. The G.W. Bush administration noticed this and for the second time readjusted its foreign policy strategy outlined in The National Security Strategy of The United States of America. Condoleezza Rice also presented foreign ‘policy

vision 3.0' in her 2008 article in Foreign Affairs, where she stressed the *importance of cooperating with China and Russia* (Rice, 2008). By the end of 2006, even Krauthammer was forced to conclude that the United States was 'past the apogee' of its unprecedented power (Krauthammer, 2006). For the sake of this discourse, I believe Krauthammer defines the confusion better. He highlights the US foreign policy in summary as to comprise; cooperation, neo-imperialism, containment, and preservation which dominated President Bush's reign.

According to (www.fas.org/irp), in 1994 a directive evolved No. 25 which designated aspiration of the United States to lean not on the UN in the solution of questions of war and peace, but on own military-political NATO alliance. Somehow, *this expansionism* has tired USA as we later on now see the Obama regime having different angling and projections between moralism and pragmatism. Whereas (Kagan, 2011) "idealists" don't care much about American interests, they just want the United States to live up to its principles and get on the right side of history — no matter what the strategic costs. On the other hand, the "pragmatists" worry about American interests and have therefore been cautious about moving away from the long-standing relationships.

Kagan argues on the two sides of idealism and pragmatism. The question today is: What constitutes pragmatism in today's Middle East? Was sticking with Mubarak a pragmatic, realistic option? By the time the Obama administration got around to supporting Mubarak's departure — after two years of "pragmatically" supporting him — he was already finished. His refusal to make even modest political reforms doomed him, and in the end it was the Egyptian people, not the US, who

pushed him out. Did the "pragmatists" want Mubarak to be assisted to stay in power against all Egyptians? Would that have served American strategic interests? The "idealists" who argued for Mubarak's departure were concerned about America's strategic interests as those who opposed it. Their pragmatic judgment was that clinging to a failing dictatorship in power could only radicalize otherwise moderate Egyptians. It is not pragmatic to cling to the status quo in a revolutionary era. The "pragmatists" worry about the risks of easing dictators from power and fear aftermaths. They are right to worry. But we should not underestimate the risks.

The incoming of Obama ushered in yet another interesting moment in the US foreign policy. Carden (2016) observes, clearly, change has failed to materialize. Instead, Obama remains firmly in the grip of foreign-policy orthodoxy that he himself has dismissed as "the Washington playbook," and which the scholar Andrew Bacevich describes as the "faith-based belief in American global primacy to be pursued regardless of how the world may be changing and heedless of costs." In addition to waging a new and more dangerous cold war with Russia, the administration—which views the South China Sea as a core national interest—launched the so-called "Asia pivot," which moves US policy toward China from one *largely based on shared business interests* to one that seeks to *contain China's rise*. The president's much-publicized trip to Southeast Asia this year was a good indication that Washington intends to surround and isolate China by employing "bandwagoning" states like Vietnam.

In his victory speech Obama's administration (Obama, 2013), the intentions for the US were on

the following dimensions; ending a decade of war, harnessing new ideas and technology (We cannot cede to other nations the technology that will power new jobs and new industries – we must claim its promise.), enduring security and lasting peace (no need of perpetual war), resolving our differences with other nations peacefully, renewing institutions that extend our capacity to manage crisis abroad, remaining the anchor of strong alliances in every corner of the globe, acting for freedom, supporting democracy in Asia and Africa. “While the means will change, our purpose endures, he said.” Some have been achieved whereas some remain farfetched.

Finally, among the distinct Obama foreign policy a bit unique from the other presidents is the Obama doctrine nick named “surrogate warfare”. Its concern was dealing with remote threats of war in their locations commonly found in Buzan and Waever’s securitization model, by using local resources. Surrogate warfare (Krieg, 2016) appears to be the compromise Obama has found as a way of dealing with the Bush legacy and a growing ‘apolarization’ of international affairs, particularly in the Middle East. Surrogate warfare offers an

alternative means of maintaining US influence in the region. Its elements include;

- Minimizing the burden of warfare for its own taxpayers, policy-makers and military.
- The fact that Patron and surrogate can be state or non-state actors,
- The concepts of asymmetric, irregular or unconventional nature,
- New warfare model in twenty-first-century operating environments,
- Achieving objectives cheaply and sustainably,
- Unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) for US covert operations,
- Capability factor,
- The reduction of human capacity, and
- The concomitant investment in technology.

In view of how this has been used by Obama, it is more of strategic military approach to war than a foreign policy. In past warfare, war by surrogate has been a constant feature in the history of warfare (Mumford, 2013). Romans employed ‘barbarian’ tribes (Lacey, 2012) to multiply their forces, relying on their local knowledge and relations with local populations.

Table 1: Post-Bipolar US Summarized Foreign Policies (FPs)

President	Years (from – to)	Ruling Party	Decisions/ Actions of US Foreign Policy
George Bush	1989-1992	Republican	New World Order (Protection of Democracy), Interventionism
Bill Clinton	1993-2000	Democrat	Trade First Policy, Friend – Foe Equilibrium Foreign Policy, Security and Economic Containment, Intervention and Isolationism, Proxy Policy.

George W. Bush	2001-2008	Republican	Cooperation, Neo-Imperialism, Containment, and Preservation
Barack Obama	2009-2016	Democrat	Economic Cooperations and Partnerships, Surrogate Strategic Warfare Policy, and Containment

Challenges linger over US foreign policy in the aftermaths of Cold War. The unipolar/multipolar challenges of the US foreign policy and her supremacy are under threat on the basis of post – Trump election demonstrations. Whereas the price of liberty goes with freedoms of expression and association which these demonstrations depict, the magnitude has not been witnessed lately. It could also be a sign of consistent maturation of this democracy. However, internal dynamics of states (Lukin, 2016) have played pivotal roles in their stability and weakening. Soviet ideology to enhance faster progress by resource concentration and nationalization proved unviable. Soviet controlled territories allowed little freedoms under totalitarian regimes which became its undoing. Such dynamics have power to break states especially in an amorphous polarity world that US is claiming supremacy over and with challenges of its economics comparatively.

In his victory message to the US (Bloom, 2016), the President- elect Trump has given a glimpse of what might be his foreign policy; “*we will get along with all other nations willing to get along with us*”, and “*we will seek common ground not hostility, partnership not conflict*” communicates volumes to the world from the unpredictable

personality attribute added to the USA foreign policy in addition to re-emphasizing “we will put America’s interests first”.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

USA foreign policy somehow seems to be moving back and forth within its history. The President – elect Trump has hinted this in his motto, “Making America Great Again”. Whether it is nostalgic, Political Scientists/ International Relation’s scholars and Historians wait to see and judge. But again, is it that USA foreign policy is depreciating? A well defined foreign policy buoys the power of a state. If this is what Trump has foreseen but blatantly, then the handlers of America must take the opportunity and rework it for their global glory. In some measure, Trump’s futurization focuses moments of history when the US was at its pick, something important for the disorder currently surrounding their foreign policy. But again, with the clouded – shadowed policies as already seen in the post – cold war, it can be easily predicted that there is a decline in the power of the US foreign policy, although no state is observably better at the moment.

As the Obama presidency ends, it’s clear that the “change” in foreign policy he promised has failed, ending the Iraq War, pursuing a nuclear-free world, improving relations with Russia, being honest broker between Israel and Palestine, and improving relations with the Arab world have all been left unfulfilled. This especially sends strong signals to the incoming – President elect Donald Trump. Instead, over his two terms in office, the

convergence of the neoconservative and Wilsonian interventionist creeds has solidified into orthodoxy. Historian William Appleman Williams (Carden, 2016) has described as the “climate of assumption.” This prevailing climate is shaped by an “inside-outside” dynamic, whereby the narrative that defines any given crisis is set on the “inside,” by administration officials and sitting ambassadors, and reinforced on the “outside,” by the establishment media. It is thus conclusive to suggest from this study that the US foreign policy is pendulumic in nature between its core beliefs and much depends on its history, this makes it very conservative to long standing interests.

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