Revisiting the Anti-Defection Law: A Theoretical Framework for Strengthening Democratic Accountability in India
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26821/IJSRC.13.11.2025.131101Keywords:
Anti-defection law, democratic accountability, party discipline, legislative autonomy, judicial interpretation, parliamentary democracy, IndiaAbstract
India’s anti-defection law, enacted through the 52nd Constitutional Amendment in 1985, was designed to curb political opportunism and enhance party cohesion in parliamentary governance. This study develops a multi-dimensional theoretical framework to evaluate the law’s impact on democratic accountability, drawing on principal-agent theory, institutional economics, and comparative constitutional analysis. Through a systematic review of 37 peer-reviewed studies and critical examination of landmark Supreme Court rulings—including Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker (2020) and Shiv Sena v. Shinde (2023)—the paper reveals that while the law reduces legislative fragmentation, it simultaneously suppresses dissent, undermines legislator autonomy, and politicizes adjudication. The proposed framework distinguishes between opportunistic and conscience-based defections, introduces graduated sanctions, and advocates for independent adjudicatory mechanisms. Comparative insights from Israel, Ethiopia, and Nigeria underscore the contextual limits of legal transplants and the risks of over-centralization. The study concludes by recommending reforms that balance party stability with representative legitimacy, offering a normative recalibration of anti-defection law within broader democratic accountability discourse.
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